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                                                              Abstract 
 
This working paper provides a business history perspective on debates about the 
Great Divergence, the rise of the gap in incomes between the West and the Rest, and the 
more recent Great Convergence, which has seen a narrowing of that gap. The literature on 
the timing and causes of the Great Divergence has focussed on macro analysis. This 
working paper identifies the potential for more engagement at the micro level of business 
enterprises.  While recognizing that the context of institutions, education and culture play a 
role in explanations of wealth and poverty, the paper calls for a closer engagement with the 
processes how these factors translated into generating productive firms and entrepreneurs. 
The challenges of catching-up were sufficiently great in the Rest that initially minorities 
held significant advantages in capital-raising and trust levels which enabled them to 
flourish as entrepreneurs. Yet by the interwar years there is evidence of more general 
emergence of modern business enterprise in Asia, Latin America and Africa. Many 
governmental policies after 1945 designed to facilitate catch-up ended up crippling such 
emergent business enterprises without putting effective alternatives in place. The second 
wave of globalization from the 1980s provided more opportunities for catch up from the 
Rest. Firms from emerging markets had the opportunity to access the global networks 
which replaced large integrated firms. There were also new ways to access knowledge and 
capital, including through management consultancies and hiring graduates from business 
schools. The upshot was the rise to global prominence of firms based in the Rest, including 
Foxcomm, Huawei,  HNA, Cemex, and TCS.
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Introduction 
             Over the last decade the Great Divergence, or the timing of when the wealth gap 
between the Western world and the Rest of the world opened up, has been prominent issue 
in the discipline of economic history. The debate has been conducted at a macro-economic 
level, however, and business historians have made hardly any contribution. They have 
made a potentially richer contribution to the less explored question why the Rest failed to 
catch up after the gap had opened up, though most of this literature has not been structured 
in terms of the Great Divergence. This working paper begins with these two debates before 
turning to the Great Convergence of the last three decades. By 2017 China was the world’s 
second largest economy. It accounted for nearly 15 per cent of world GDP. Asia as a whole 
accounted for 34 per cent of world GDP; the United States and Canada for 28 per cent; and 
Europe for only 21 per cent (World Economic Forum, 2017). While many developing 
economies, especially in Africa, were still desperately poor compared to the West, the 
scale and speed of the Great Convergence was nevertheless striking.  
The Great Divergence 
Although the data is highly contested, most economic historians would agree that 
the large inequality which became evident in the nineteenth century between regions is 
relatively “new,” at least in historical terms. The timing, however, remains contentious. A 
consensus that incomes had diverged between Europe and China in the early modern 
period was disrupted around 2000 when Pomeranz put the term “the Great Divergence” 
into scholarly usage by suggesting that certain regions of China, India, and Western 
Europe were at broadly similar levels of agricultural productivity, commercial 
development and the ability of some firms to raise capital in the middle of the eighteenth 
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century. The Great Divergence in wealth between the West and the Rest, then, began with 
the Industrial Revolution and the advent of modern economic growth in Britain (Pomeranz, 
2000).   
             The Pomeranz hypothesis provoked a surge of quantitative research on 
comparative income levels. Research has focused on two indices – GDP per capita and real 
wage levels. This research has mostly concluded suggested that income levels between 
Europe and Asia were already wide in the eighteenth century, reflecting trends which 
began at least three hundred years earlier. It suggests that the real income gap was between 
the most advanced countries in Europe – Britain, the Netherlands and Belgium – and other 
regions, whether China, India or central and southern Europe. What happened during the 
nineteenth century was that much more of the West caught up to the advanced North Sea 
countries, but the Rest did not (Broadberry and Gupta, 2006:Van Zanden, 2009; Allen et al 
2011; Li and Van Zanden, 2012). 
             A major critique of this entire literature is that historical Chinese data simply does 
not support the use being made of it to derive these statistics. Deng and O’Brien have 
written extensively why available data in China cannot be compared to that available in 
western countries such as Britain and the Netherlands. Their own estimates, using an 
entirely different approach, suggests that China may have been falling behind the West 
from the early seventeenth century, but their primary achievement has been to cast doubt 
on what was becoming a consensus in economic history – that the Great Divergence really 
did start in the early modern period. (Deng and O’Brien, 2015, 2016a, 2016B, 2017). 
              A striking feature of the Great Divergence debate, beyond the shaky data on 
which it rests, is that it has been, as Zan and Deng put it, “conducted at the macro-level, i.e. 
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macro regions (e.g. the Yangtze Delta and Western Europe), macro sectors (e.g. 
technology, services, industry, farming, and governance), and macro issues (e.g. growth, 
development, living standards.”  (Zan and Deng, 2017).  Yet the same study showed the 
potential for a business history approach. The authors point to improved management 
accounting methods which appeared in early modern Europe, especially sixteenth century 
Venice, and the lack of any equivalent in China. They speculate that this may be due not 
back luck that archives were not preserved, but rather a reflection of different attitudes 
towards finance and money than in the West. (Zan and Deng, 2017) Business historians 
have a real opportunity to engage in the Great Divergence debate by investigating 
managerial practices and systems in the early modern period.                          
 
The Failure to Catch Up 
                  A much less explored question, and one to which business historians have more 
to contribute, is why after the Great Divergence had happened, it took the Rest so long to 
catch up. More particularly, while many regions of Europe caught up with the home of 
modern industrialization around the North Sea, it took the Rest of the world much longer. 
Bénétrix, O’Rourke and Williamson (2015) have shown that from the late nineteenth 
century, the “periphery” began to follow the path of industrialization set in the West. Some 
Latin American countries began such “convergence” from the 1870s, followed by some 
Asian countries after 1890, followed again by parts of sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle 
East during the interwar years. Yet the emergence and growth of modern industrial sectors 
was not sufficient to close the substantial income gaps which had opened. This was 
primarily because dynamic and innovative firms were slow to emerge from these regions.  
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               Most of the existing explanations for the slowness of catch-up have been at the 
macro-level, and have only implicitly explained the lack of emergence of modern firms. 
These explanations can be crudely summarized as falling into three buckets. The first, and 
initial, explanatory bucket is the role of culture. The West had the “right” culture, and the 
rest had “wrong” cultures for capitalist enterprise. Writers from Weber (2011 edit) to 
Landes (1998) to Mokyr (1990, chapter 9) have made this argument, as has more recently 
Ferguson when he identified the Protestant work ethic as one of the West’s “killer apps.”  
(Ferguson, 2011) However leaving aside the well-known criticisms of such cultural 
generalizations, these studies have never explained how exactly culture impacts firm 
formation and quality of business decision-making. 
             The second big explanation is that, following the work of North, the West had the 
“right” institutions to promote capitalist economic growth, and the Rest did not. (North 
1990, 2005). This has led to debates about the long-term impact of particular colonial 
regimes, such North America had the “right” sort of colonialism, while the Rest did not, 
and about countries with common law having the “right” legal regime for encouraging 
capitalist development, and the rest not. A big problem is that this literature has largely 
used property rights laws as a proxy for institutions. (Jones 2013, 14-18). It is not evident 
that the West had superior property rights regimes to parts of the Rest. British India has the 
common law system. The widespread existence of market activities and the importance of 
private property in nineteenth century (and earlier) China would not suggest an 
overwhelmingly poor property rights regime. (Faure 2006, Deng 2000). While the lack of 
company law in that country might have made capital-raising hard, when China finally 
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introduced a Company Law Act enabling limited liability in 1904, few Chinese companies 
registered under the act. (Kirby 1995)  
             Nor is it evident that business enterprises were simply passive recipients of legal 
regimes. Musacchio has raised serious doubts concerning the adverse impact of civil law 
regimes on financial and economic development. Brazil was a French civil law country 
with apparently inadequate creditor protection and contract enforcement, but Musacchio 
found that Brazilian firms used their own byelaws to offer strong protection for equity 
investors. (Musacchio, 2008)  
                  Finally, education (or lack of it) has been used as an explanatory factor for 
global wealth and poverty (Easterlin, 1981). Goldin (2001) has made a strong case for 
attributing American industrial leadership to the unique egalitarian mass provision of post 
elementary schooling achieved in the United States during the early twentieth century. 
While plausible, the link with the development of modern business has never been clearly 
established. Worryingly, eighteen and nineteenth century China had widespread literacy, 
which did not translate into the creation of modern firms. (Deng 2000) Probably the 
greatest negative consequence of low education levels was raising the cost of skilled labor. 
In the case of colonial India, the high cost of skilled labor has been identified as one 
possible explanation why the country remained inclined to small-scale traditional 
manufacture. (Roy 2000, chapter 7) 
              Context – whether institutional, cultural, or education – matters for capitalist 
development, but the existing Great Divergence literature, primarily written by economists, 
has yet to provide firm evidence how exactly it shaped entrepreneurship and business. 
Baumol’s work on differences in what he terms the rules of the game between society 
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enables a more explicit connection to be built. Baumol argued that the contribution of 
entrepreneurship on societies varied because of the allocation between productive activities 
such as innovation and unproductive activities such as rent seeking or organized crime. 
This allocation, Baumol suggested, was in turn influenced by the relative pay offs offered 
by a society to such activities. (Baumol 1990)  
          Maurer’s study of the Mexican financial system from the late nineteenth century 
shows how this context played out in one country by demonstrating how the existence of 
an undemocratic political system and selective enforcement of property rights shaped the 
financial and business system. Limited in its ability to raise taxes to finance infrastructure 
projects as well as fend off political opponents, the Mexican government of the dictator 
Porfirio Diaz relied on banks to provide credit, while the banks relied on the government to 
enforce property rights. A select few bankers were given extensive privileges producing a 
highly concentrated banking system. Each bank grew fat in its own protected niche. To 
overcome the problems associated with information asymmetry, banks lent to their own 
shareholders and other insiders. In the case of the textile industry, banks did not lend to the 
best firms, but the best-connected firms. Poorly defined property rights prevented those 
excluded from the insider networks from pledging collateral and finding another financial 
route. (Maurer 2002) 
             More broadly, institutional and societal context was a major factor explaining why 
technological catch-up was a huge entrepreneurial challenge for entrepreneurs in 
nineteenth century India, Mexico and elsewhere in the Rest. The new advanced 
technologies of the West were embedded in quite different (not better or worse)  
institutional, economic and social contexts than in the Rest. Entrepreneurs could not 
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simply import them and they would work. Factor endowments fundamentally shaped the 
commercial viability of different transferred technologies.(Roy 2009) Relevant 
technologies needed to be identified, they need to be adapted, they needed to be financed, 
and they needed to be used. This was challenging and costly, although not impossible. 
(Beatty 2003a and 2003b) This explains, in part, why there were such significant regional 
differences in entrepreneurial performance in many nineteenth century Latin American 
countries, despite having the same laws, language and culture at the national level. 
(Cerutti, 1996)  
          Closer examination of the “institutional arrangements” which promoted growth in 
many countries raise many questions about the “right” and “wrong” institutions which 
promoted entrepreneurship and firm growth. For example, the historical evidence does not 
support the argument that the protection of intellectual property rights and patents was 
important to promoting entrepreneurship from an institutional perspective. The evidence 
that patents in Britain played an important role in the Industrial Revolution and later is 
weak. The cost of obtaining a patent in eighteenth century Britain was high, and they were 
difficult to enforce. (Mokyr 2009) Moser showed that, historically, that in countries with 
patent laws the majority of innovations have occurred outside of the patent system, while 
conversely countries without patent laws produced as many innovations as countries with 
patent laws during the same time periods, and their innovations were of comparable 
quality. (Moser 2013) 
The role of colonialism poses a particular challenge to institutional explanations of 
variations in the allocation of entrepreneurial energy. Most economics research on the 
impact of colonialism on the Great Divergence focusses on the highly exploitative first 
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stages of European colonialism, especially in Latin America.  However the policy regime 
of empires changed over time. While traditional Indian handicraft industries suffered from 
British free trade policies in the nineteenth century, during the interwar decades British 
India was protectionist, including against British imports. (Morris 1983). The British 
brought not only political stability to nineteenth century India, after decades of turbulence. 
but also their legal system with protection of property rights and contract enforcement. The 
British administrators in India simplified and codified British laws in ways which appear to 
have made them even more enterprise-friendly.  
Yet when investments began in large-scale industry from the mid-nineteenth 
century, they were highly clustered geographically and ethnically. Scotsmen developed the 
modern jute industry of Calcutta from the 1860s, whilst the tiny ethnic minority of Parsees 
developed the textile industries on the west coast. Modern indigenous entrepreneurship 
became, and has remained, highly concentrated ethnically. Subsequently Marwaris, 
originating from Rajasthan, and the Vanias from Gujerat joined the Parsees as the 
dominant entrepreneurial groups, a situation which lasted until the early twenty first 
century (Tripathi 2004: Markovits, 2008) 
   Market size might be important. The growth and size of the American market 
provides a key component of the Chandlerian explanation for the emergence of large 
integrated firms in the United States. (Chandler 1997) It seems plausible that both in the 
case of Britain, the first industrializer, and Japan, the first non-Western country to create 
modern business enterprises, the identification of entrepreneurial opportunities, and the 
building of managerial structures which permitted their exploitation, may have been 
facilitated by geographically compact domestic markets and unusually large capital cities. 
10 
  
The market opportunities for firms and entrepreneurs in most of Asia, Latin 
America and Africa were more constrained. They often faced great difficulties if they 
wanted to sell beyond their local markets because of poor transport and communications 
infrastructure. In India, market conditions have been identified as one explanation why 
India’s powerful and rich merchants in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries left 
manufacturing in the hands of small artisans, pointing to fragmented markets, inadequate 
transport infrastructure, and lawlessness (Tripathi, 2004) These constraints were relaxed as 
the British colonial regime promoted transport infrastructure, but a well-established 
argument in the literature on nineteenth century India has maintained that the small scale of 
the domestic market retarded the growth of a modern machinery industry. (Morris, 1983) 
Yet it was often foreign firms, or ethnic minorities, which took advantage of 
expanding opportunities. Variations in entrepreneurial cognition may have been important.  
Most local entrepreneurs may not have been well-informed about the pace of change in 
advanced economies, and less knowledgeable about their markets, including the market for 
skilled expertise. A lack of English-speaking ability might have constrained access 
advanced knowledge in Latin America. The former imperial powers, Spain and Portugal, 
were in the backward south of Europe, and were not good role models of modern industrial 
growth.  
As Casson has suggested, cultural differences towards information and “trust” 
levels may have been especially important in explaining variations in the quality of 
entrepreneurial judgments. (Casson 1991)  It is evident that business enterprises in many 
non-Western societies were often challenged to grow beyond a certain size because their 
societies found it hard to “trust” non-family members as either managers or equity holders. 
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Japan was an unusual society where “blood ties” were not decisive in determining trust 
levels. Arguably, the rapid Japanese move to employing professional managers may have 
reflected cultural traditions of adopting sons.  
However many of the allegedly cultural explanations of why businesses in the Rest 
looked different to those in the West turn out to be misconceived. Much of the early 
literature on Latin American entrepreneurship in the nineteenth century blamed lack of 
economic growth on an alleged commercial and speculative ethos of the region’s 
entrepreneurs. The family-owned diversified business groups which appeared during the 
nineteenth century in Latin America (and elsewhere) were regarded as inherently 
inefficient, and primarily vehicles for rent-seeking. However, such groups are now better 
understood as rational responses to weaknesses in capital markets, shortage of managerial 
resources, and high transactions costs. Within such conditions, business groups can, and 
often are, often the most effective forms of business organization. (Jones and Khanna, 
2006)  
Indeed, as entrepreneurs in the Rest began catching-up with their Western 
counterparts, they were often successful in developing hybrid organizational forms adapted 
to their local contexts. In China, the new modern business enterprises which appeared in 
early twentieth century typically combined the formal organization of Western-style 
corporations with traditional, well-established business practices from China’s pre-
industrial past.  A study of the rapid growth of Shanghai’s print machinery industry from 
the late nineteenth century has shown that in this industry, unlike others such as textiles, 
Chinese entrepreneurs were so successful that they were able to replace foreign machine 
imports with products from the local machine industry. (Reed, 2004)   
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 The pre-eminence of ethnic and religious minorities in entrepreneurial activity  
points towards a combination of contextual explanations for the slow growth of modern 
business enterprise. As many countries in the Rest began to industrialize, minorities or 
immigrants were especially important in new firm creation. These included Chinese in 
south-east Asian, Indians in east Africa, Lebanese in West Africa, Italians in Argentina, 
and French in Mexico. Their success has often ascribed to particular ethical or working 
practices, but their role is more plausibly explained as a demonstration of the challenges 
faced by entrepreneurs in societies where trust levels were poor, information flows 
inadequate, institutions weak and capital scarcity. In such situations, small groups with 
shared values held major advantages as entrepreneurs. If in addition, they established an 
intermediary role between locals and Western firms, they could secure easier access to 
knowledge and information, from and about, Western countries. 
 The prominent roles of particular ethnic and religious groups in Indian modern 
industry can be explained in such terms. The role of the tiny Parsee community around 
Bombay has been variously described as the result of close relations with the colonial 
authorities, “outsider” minority status, and a “Protestant” style work ethic. (Desai 1968)  
However the Marwaris were far less close to the British. Indeed, a number of families, like 
the Bajaj, became active in the Independence struggle. Other explanations for their pre-
eminence have been found in unique cost accounting methods and the work ethos. 
(Timburg, 1978)  
Wolcott has combined both cultural and institutional factors to explain the pre-
eminence of Indian minorities. She relates the situation to India’s caste system, and argues 
that the payoffs to entrepreneurship differed across caste lines. Members of the 
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moneylending and trading castes like the Marwaris could enforce contracts through 
reputation and membership deterred cheating. As a result, they were efficient at providing 
financial and other resources to entrepreneurs within their own castes. However, the large 
number of potential entrepreneurs outside these groups lacked privileged access to these 
informal financial networks, reducing their incentives to engage in productive 
entrepreneurship. (Wolcott, 2010) 
The ethnic clustering in modern entrepreneurship in India, and elsewhere, was 
striking, but as Roy has suggested, another way to look at such clustering was 
geographically. Before 1914 Bombay and Calcutta accounted for half the modern factories 
in India, and even more of related services such as banking and insurance. Unlike other 
cities in India, they had grown through the activities of the East India Company, and were 
outward-oriented and cosmopolitan. In these two port cities, Roy observes, “modern Indian 
business enterprise and business families congregated and recreated a globalized world 
with strong Indian characteristics.”  (Roy, 2012)  
The emergence of hubs such as Bombay, and modern entrepreneurship in general, 
also took place within the context of the wider political economy environment. 
Explanations for why ethnic Chinese business became disproportionately important in 
Southeast Asia typically stress cultural factors, including the role of family, dialect groups 
and the Confucian value system. With respect to the latter, it has often been argued that 
social trust, the social obligations that bind family and lineage, was strengthened by the 
Confucian belief, and that provided the bedrock of commercial networking. Yet while 
some or all of these features may be significant, the growth of Chinese entrepreneurship in 
Southeast Asia also has to be placed within a wider political economy context. From the 
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fourteenth century, the region’s rulers favored foreign over local merchants because the 
latter might pose a political threat. Through the seventeenth century local trading 
communities, whether Malay or Filipino, continued to flourish, but the Chinese role was 
strengthened by the arrival of Western merchants, for the Chinese positioned themselves as 
intermediaries. By the late nineteenth century, the Chinese had secured the position of 
revenue farmers across the region, both in colonial and non-colonial areas. This made them 
indispensable for local and colonial governments, while providing a source of funds for 
their business interests. (Brown 2000)  
It was also within the context of Western geo-political power that European and US 
firms surged abroad to the Rest looking for commodities and markets. By 1914 world FDI 
was not only substantial compared to world output, it was also primarily located in the 
non-Western world. Latin America and Asia were especially important as host regions, 
representing 33 and 21 per cent respectively of the total world stock of FDI. (Jones 2005; 
23)  If domestic entrepreneurship in the Rest struggled to get traction, it needs to be 
explained why foreign entrepreneurship did not exercise a more productive effect on local 
business systems.  
The industrial composition of this FDI provides a partial answer. Possibly one half 
of total world FDI was invested in natural resources, and a further one-third in services, 
especially financing, insuring, transporting commodities and foodstuffs. Manufacturing 
FDI primarily went to serve the markets of the West, whilst most FDI in the Rest was 
either in resources or services. 
Yet the establishment and maintenance of mines, oil fields, plantations, shipping 
depots, and railroad systems involved the transfer of packages of organizational and 
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technological knowledge to host economies. Given the absence of appropriate 
infrastructure in developing countries, foreign enterprises frequently not only introduced 
technologies specific to their activities, but also social technologies such as police, postal 
and education systems. Between the late nineteenth century and 1914 residents of most of 
the world’s cities were provided with access to electricity, in their homes or at work, or 
else in the form of street lighting. (Hausman et al, 2008)   
However spillovers and linkages to local entrepreneurs were limited by the nature 
of global capitalism at the time. Many natural resource investments were enclavist. 
Minerals and agricultural commodities were exported with only the minimum of 
processing. Most value was added to the product in the developed economies. Foreign 
firms were large employers of labor at that time, but training was only provided to local 
employees to enable them to fill unskilled or semiskilled jobs. The nature of the industries 
and these employment practices meant that the diffusion of organizing and technological 
skills to developing economies was far less than to developed economies. Technological 
diffusion worked best when there were already established firms which could be 
stimulated to become more competitive by foreign firms, or had the capacity to absorb 
workers who moved on from foreign firms. (Jones 2014) 
Nor were foreign companies typically transformers of domestic institutions. While 
theoretically they may have been channels to transfer aspects of the institutional 
arrangements in their home countries to their hosts, for the most part they reinforced local 
institutions. This was most directly seen in the concession system. In order to entice firms 
to make investments in mines, railroads, and so on, foreign firms were often given large 
concessions often involving freedom from taxation and other requirements over very long 
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periods. (Jones 2005)  Concessions worked to lock-in already sub-optimal institutional 
arrangements. In Mexico, President Diaz’s contracts and concessions to the British 
engineering contractor Weetman Pearson was effective in securing major infrastructure 
improvements in railroads, ports and the drainage of Mexico City, and Pearson also laid 
the basis for the successful Mexican oil industry. Yet Pearson’s very success strengthened 
the autocratic and crony capitalist regime of Diaz.  (Garner 2011)  
The nature of the first global economy, then, meant that there was limited diffusion 
of entrepreneurship and organizing capabilities from Western firms in the Rest. Their 
primary impact was often to lock-in countries as resource providers, and to reinforce 
institutional constraints on domestic entrepreneurship rather than removing them. This 
partly explains why the domestic entrepreneurial response to globalization was weaker 
than might have been imagined, which at its heart lay in a lagged understanding of the 
opportunities offered by the new global economy combined with problems building 
effective business organizations which could absorb foreign technological and 
organizational skills. Public policy was one way to break constraints on local 
entrepreneurs, but few governments in developing countries had either the autonomy or the 
capacity to pursue effective public policies.  
 Yet by 1914 the evidence, patchy as it might be, suggests that the lag was being 
addressed in India, China, and some countries in Latin America, especially Argentina, 
where five large business groups had built diversified businesses spanning both 
manufacturing, finance and resources. (Barbero 2015, 8-14). During the interwar years 
there were significant examples of strong locally-owned business enterprises emerging in 
India, China, Egypt, Turkey and elsewhere. (Koll 2003, Zelin, 2005, Davis 1983, Colpan 
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and Jones, 2016). However after World War 2, many governments opted for state-led 
industrialization programs which frequently disrupted local firms, whilst blocking or 
discouraging foreign firms. Protectionism and restrictions on foreign firms provided a 
context for new local firms to emerge, but these policies also provided incentives for firms 
to build skills in political contacts rather than technology. (Jones, 2013) 
       By 1980 the gap in income levels between the rich nations and the Rest was 
bigger than in 1914. Japan was the only case of a spectacular catch up, with a number of 
other smaller East and south-east Asian economies following at a distance. Elsewhere, 
state interventionist regimes had encountered growing problems of macro-economic 
instability and hyper-inflation by the 1970s. (Jones, 2013) 
The Great Convergence 
The fast economic growth seen in China and India, and certain other regions of the 
Rest also, from the 1980s provide limited support for North-style institutional arguments. 
China’s resurgence began under Deng Xiaoping, who had little concern with controls over 
the executive, human rights, political rights or intellectual property protection.  There is 
more support for Baumol’s argument that shifts in the rules of the game more broadly can 
stimulate productive entrepreneurship. Policy liberalization and deregulation important in 
allowing capitalist enterprise to flourish, even in Communist China.  
Interestingly, many of the businesses which flourished with liberalization over the 
last thirty years had been founded and grew in the earlier era of import substitution. This 
policy regime provided local firms with opportunities to achieve scale within their 
protected domestic markets. A pioneer of this strategy was post-1945, which excluded 
most inward FDI, enabling automobile firms like Toyota and Nissan, and their electronics 
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equivalents, to scale at home before seeking foreign markets. Two decades later it was in 
the context of a protected local market, and a repressive military regime, that South Korean 
chaebol such as Samsung got started. Similarly Cemex, now one of the world’s largest 
cement companies, was founded in Mexico in 1906, and was able to grow in a sheltered 
environment slowly becoming a regional player and then, in the 1970s, a national player. 
As the Mexican and other economies liberalized, it was well-positioned to expand 
globally. In 1992, CEMEX began globalization by purchasing Spain's two largest cement 
companies.            
  In India, the era of the so-called “License Raj” between the 1950s and 1980s also 
enabled firms to grow within their domestic market. Arguably, it laid the basis for the 
country’s subsequently successful IT services sector. Postwar India had growing numbers 
of engineers owing to the many national institutes, engineering universities and regional 
colleges established after 1947. However, it had little choice to be totally dependent on US 
computer makers. During the 1960s and 1970s a handful of locally-owned firms were 
established to develop and run applications software for Indian companies and research 
institutions that had brought or leased mainframes from IBM and other US companies. 
Tata, which had remained India’s largest business group, established the first of these 
firms, Tata Consulting Services in 1968. This and other ventures remained small, however, 
until 1977, when, after the Indian government tightened the laws on foreign ownership of 
firms, IBM and other US firms divested. 
    The departure of IBM opened new opportunities for local firms. TCS developed 
a relationship with another US computer maker, Burroughs, which provided an important 
channel of new technology. In 1982 the start-up Infosys was founded by the dynamic 
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entrepreneur Narayana Murthy. The Indian firms built a strong trade association, 
NASSCOM, which sought to enhance and certify the quality of Indian firms. By the time 
policy regulation got underway in 1991, which gave Indian IT firms a freer hand in 
establishing marketing offices abroad and serving foreign clients, it had built strong 
organizational capabilities. The software industry became focused on Bangalore, where the 
British had established India’s first aircraft factory during World War 2, and which was the 
home of two of India’s premier institutes of higher education in pure science. Like Silicon 
Valley, there was also a pleasant climate, at least before pollution began to increase. The 
government’s establishment of a Software Technology Park, or export zone, in Bangalore 
in 1990, and an influx of expertise and contracts from the many expatriate Indians 
employed in Silicon Valley, were other influential factors in the growth of the Bangalore 
cluster. (Parthasarathy and Aoyama, 2006)  
The liberalization of policies towards foreign firms was important too in the Great 
Convergence. China is a showcase for the transforming impact of global capitalism, as 
foreign firms played a key initial role in China’s economic growth, and accounted for a 
high percentage of China’s exports. (Vogel, 2011)  It is less evident that multinationals had 
a truly transformational effect on the Rest, even though almost everywhere policy regimes 
sought to attract them. In countries where export-oriented FDI was concentrated within 
free trade zones, linkages with local firms were particularly weak.  (Jones 2014) 
Nevertheless, certain aspects of global capitalism as it evolved from the 1980s 
delivered more opportunities for firms and entrepreneurs based in the Rest. An important 
development was the disintegration of the boundaries of M-form firms from the 1980s as 
many large Western corporations suffered from growing managerial diseconomies and low 
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rates of innovation caused by size and diversification. The result was divestment of “non-
core” businesses, outsourcing of many value-added activities, and the formation of 
alliances with other firms which acted as suppliers and customers, or as partners in 
innovation. While large Western corporations remained powerhouses of innovation 
spending and market power, they formed components of a worldwide web of inter-firm 
connections.  
          The disintegration of production systems and their replacement by networks of inter-
firm linkages lowered barriers for new entrants from the Rest. Within a network-type 
global economy, firms from emerging markets were able to piggy back on incumbent 
Western or Japanese firms as customers through subcontracting, linkages and leverages. 
(Mathews 2002) The spectacular growth of Taiwan's personal-computer industry from the 
1980s, for example, was based on contract manufacturing for Western firms.  However 
despite their technical capabilities, manufacturing prowess, and scale, most leading 
Taiwanese firms except Acer did not develop their own capabilities in branding and 
marketing. The nature of the relationship with established companies in the West, as well 
as local competition, seems to have constrained capability development among most firms. 
(Yu and Shih, 2014) 
              The Taiwanese electronics contract manufacturer Foxconn, founded by Terry Gou 
in 1974 (initially called Hon Hai) grew to be a $140 billion company in 2017 with plants 
all over the world. A central driver of this growth was its role as the largest components 
supplier to Apple. Apple began outsourcing to Foxcomm in the late 1990s. Gou developed 
close relations with local government officials in China who provided cheap land and 
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subsidies for plants to manufacture Apple products. When the iPhone was launched in 
2007, Foxcomm secured agreement with the local government in Zhengzhou to subsidize 
the building of an industrial park located inside a bonded zone, with customs facilities at 
the factory gate to facilitate iPhone exports. The located government recruited and trained 
the manufacturing workforce which by 2016 amounted to 350,000 workers. Billions of 
dollars of financial incentives were provided by the local government also. (Barboza 2016)  
By then Foxcomm manufactured 90 per cent of Apple’s iPhones. Foxcomm did not 
develop its own brands, but in 2016 it did acquire the troubled Japanese electronics 
company Sharp, which had an extensive branded consumer products business. By that year 
Foxcomm’s annual revenues had reached $140 billion. 
                  In some cases contractors created their own brands in time. The growth of 
Galanz was one example. Founded in 1978 by Liang Qingde as a company that dealt in the 
trading of duck feathers, Galanz began producing OEM Toshiba-branded microwave ovens 
in 1993. Galanz later purchased the appliance division from Toshiba. By the following 
decade Galanz had become the world’s largest microwave manufacturer. (Mathews 2002)  
            If a major constraint for firms based in the Rest was not only the existence of 
entrepreneurial opportunities, but also the building of organizational capabilities to exploit 
them, then a number of developments during the second global economy alleviated this 
challenge, and facilitated “accelerated internationalization.”  (Matthews and Zander 2007)  
First, diaspora assumed a renewed importance as transferors of entrepreneurship 
and capital, and means by which firms could access management talent. The revitalized 
use of diaspora reflected changes in policies in China and India especially made them more 
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attractive locations to do business, encouraging diaspora to return. After 1980, ethnic 
Chinese firms based in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and later elsewhere, became the leading 
foreign investors as China liberalized its economy. They enjoyed connections (guanxi) in 
China, which reduced the transactions costs of investment by offering contacts with public 
authorities and inside information, and were welcomed by the Chinese government. Many 
engineers settled in Silicon Valley and made up a quarter of the workforce by the 1990s. 
As the Indian economy grew from the 1990s, there has been a significant reverse flow back 
to India. This was assisted by the Indian government’s new policy in 2003 of granting dual 
nationality to some overseas Indian residents abroad. These diaspora links provided 
valuable connections between Silicon Valley and Bangalore, encouraging business 
connections and capital flows. (Pandey 2004)    
          Secondly, both business schools and management consultants provided much 
easier access to new management knowledge, and they have played important roles in 
building organizational capabilities in firms. In postwar Europe both US management 
consultancies and business schools were influential diffusers of American managerial 
knowledge to Europe and other developed countries. The impact on emerging markets only 
became stronger later. McKinsey opened in India in 1992. From the 1980s leading US 
business schools have internationalized their faculty and student body.  
Many of the most successful companies from the Rest used US consulting firms to 
provide advice on strategy, sent senior managers on executive programs at the top business 
schools, and recruited MBAs as graduates. None of this meant that such firms evolved as 
replicas of US firms, but it did mean that they had faster and better access to information 
about the latest managerial ideas in ways which were impossible fifty years ago. Cemex’s 
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global growth, for example, was led by a new generation of the founding Zambrano 
family. Lorenzo Zambrano, the architect of a new international strategy, had been educated 
at Stanford Business School, and sought strategy advice from Boston Consulting Group. 
(Lessard and Reavis, 2009)  
            A final, important, factor in the growth of global firms from some emerging 
markets was support from their host governments. The important role of governments in 
promoting catch-up echoed the model of the economic historian Alexander Gershenkron 
writing in the early 1960s who argued that governments would be important forces in 
countries seeking to catch-up from economic backwardness. (Gershenkron 1962). The 
spectacular growth of Gulf-based airlines such as Emirates and Qatar provided a prominent 
example, but it was in China were some of the spectacular results were seen.  China was 
among the governments which used state-owned firms as national champions to pursue 
strategic objectives. (Child and Rodriques 2005). The growth of Chinese firms to dominate 
the global solar industry provided one such example. (Jones 2017: 342-345). A related 
category were highly politically connected firms such as HNA, which grew rapidly from 
the 2000s from its original business of Hainan Airlines, which included major investments 
in Western businesses such as Hilton and Deutsche Bank.(Weinland et al, 2017) 
               However while official blessing was key to growth for all Chinese global 
corporations, some corporations had less direct support from the government. This smaller 
category of firms were often founded by victims of the Cultural Revolution in their youths. 
They included Zong Qinhou and Wahaha), and Ren Zhengfei and Huawei.1 The 
spectacular growth of Huawei, the Chinese internet router company, was striking. Ren 
                                                 
1 Email from Enlan Wang to Geoffrey Jones, June 26 2017. 
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Zhengfei received credit from the state-owned development bank. Wireless networking 
was a strategic industry for the Chinese government, not least because the equipment was 
the hardware which enabled the government to censor information and monitor activity on 
the internet. However Huawei’s growth was not a simple story of growth based on political 
Gerscontacts and support. Ren Zhengfei implemented a clever strategy of building 
businesses in remoter and outlying cities in China before targeting the major cities where 
the American firm Cisco and others had built a market since the 1990s. He then repeated 
the strategy globally, first selling to countries like Russia, Brazil and Thailand, before 
moving to more advanced markets, especially in Europe. Huawei also invested heavily in 
research, creating research centers in numerous locations around the world including 
Bangalore and Silicon Valley. Innovation was supported by an aggressive corporate 
culture which rewarded talent. (Jones 2013) 
           The growth of powerful globally active corporations from the Rest, such as Huawei 
and Foxcomm and their equivalents in other countries, was a singular feature of 
contemporary global economy and a driver of the Great Convergence. Business historians 
have started to research how this happened, and there is much more to do. 
 
Conclusion 
This working paper has sought to integrate a business history perspective into 
debates about the Great Divergence and its consequences, and the more recent Great 
Convergence. While recognizing that the context of institutions, education and culture play 
a role in explanations of wealth and poverty, the working paper calls for a closer 
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engagement with the processes how these factors translate into generating productive firms 
and entrepreneurs.  
            In explaining why the development of modern business enterprise in the Rest 
lagged, the recasting of existing literature into the framework of the Great Divergence 
debate permits important insights. The societal and cultural embeddedness of new 
technologies provide one important explanatory factor. Evidently, the challenges were 
sufficiently great in the Rest that minorities held significant advantages in capital-raising 
and trust levels which enabled them to flourish as entrepreneurs. They were also benefitted 
from a greater willingness to engage Western firms and colonial governments. In contrast, 
multinationals proved disappointing diffusers of organizational skills and information to 
the Rest, and had limited importance in relieving the institutional, human capital or other 
constraints faced by local entrepreneurs. By the interwar years there is evidence of 
emergent modern entrepreneurship and business enterprise in Asia, Latin America and 
Africa. However many governmental policies after 1945 designed to facilitate catch-up 
ended up crippling such emergent business enterprises without putting an effective 
alternatives in place.  
           The second wave of globalization from the 1980s, which is now ending, provided 
more opportunities for catch up from the Rest. Firms from emerging markets had the 
opportunity to access the global networks which in part replaced large integrated firms. 
There were also new ways for firms in the Rest to access knowledge and capital. Business 
historians have an enormous opportunity to contribute to understanding these processes. 
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